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many properties we must not, ascribe to him;
but though we do have that much knowledge
of his essence, he has countless attributes we
cannot grasp (ibid., vol. VII, p. 46). Clarity
and distinctness does imply conceptual 
possibility, and hence (since the existence 
of God guarantees that there is a power
capable of creating whatever we conceive
clearly and distinctly), real possibility 
(cf. ibid., vol. VII, pp. 71, 78).
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concept In the history of philosophy the
term “concept” and kindred expressions
have been used in a variety of technical
senses (e.g., by Aquinas, Kant, Frege). The
majority of contemporary philosophers,
however, use the term in its central non-
technical sense, which is exhibited in com-
plex gerundive phrases of the form “the
concept of being F”. In what follows “con-
cept” will be used in this way.
Concepts are intensional entities in the
sense that two concepts can apply to exactly
the same objects and nevertheless be dis-
tinct. For example, the concept of being a 
triangle is not identical with the concept of
being a trilateral. This example shows that
concepts are indeed hyperintensional in 
the sense that they can be distinct even if 
they necessarily apply to the same objects.
Because concepts are hyperintensional,
they are ideally suited to serve as the senses
(meanings) of predicates. For example, “is 
a triangle” expresses the concept of being a
triangle; “is a trilateral” expresses the con-
cept of being a trilateral. Since these concepts
are not identical, we have a neat explanation
of why the indicated predicates are not
exact synonyms.
Concepts are a kind of universal, so each
of the standard views on the ontological
status of universals has been applied to
concepts as a special case. nominalism:
only particulars (and perhaps collections 
of particulars) exist; therefore, either con-
cepts do not exist or they are reducible (in 
the spirit of Carnap) to collections of par-
ticulars (including perhaps particulars that
are not actual but only possible). conceptu-
alism: concepts exist but are dependent on
the mind. Realism: concepts exist inde-
pendently of the mind. Realism has two
main versions: in rebus realism – a concept
exists only if it has instances; ante rem
realism – a concept can exist even if it has
no instances. For example, the concept of
being a man weighing over a ton has no
instances; however, it is plausible to hold
that this concept does exist. After all, this 
concept would seem to be what is expressed
by the predicate “is a man weighing over 
a ton”.
Perhaps the most perplexing question
about concepts is how they succeed in being
about objects. On one view, there is a prim-
itive, unanalyzable relation of representation
that holds between concepts and objects.
This view has the disadvantage of making
representation an unexplained mystery. A
second view is that the relation of representa-
tion is analyzable in terms of resemblance,
causation, or some other naturalistic notion.
While not mysterious, none of these analyses
has, thus far, succeeded in avoiding clear-cut
counterexamples. A third view is that what
is needed is a certain sort of logical theory,
specifically, an intensional logic. An inten-
sional logic promises to provide a systematic
account of the logical behavior of inten-
sional entities – properties, relations,
states of affairs, propositions and concepts (see
proposition, state of affairs). The idea is
that concepts are logical constructs whose
ultimate “constituents” are the real pro-
perties and relations of things in the world.
A concept is about those objects that have
the properties and relations required by the
correct logical analysis of the concept. On this
approach, the need for a primitive relation
of representation thus disappears; at the
same time, the easy counterexamples that
beset naturalistic analyses (see naturalism)
can evidently be avoided.
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concrete/abstract Realists and antirealists
presuppose an intuitive distinction between
abstracta and concreta in their debates about
the problem of universals (see nominal-
ism; Platonism). Evidently, every entity is
either concrete or abstract, and no entity is
both. Plausibly, the division between concreta
and abstracta is a basic categorial division; 
on some views, it is the most basic categorial
division. Examples of abstracta are squareness
(a property); betweenness (a relation); there
being horses (a proposition); the null set;
and the number 7 (see class, collection,
set; proposition, state of affairs; rela-
tions). Examples of concreta are a stone (a
material substance); God (a non-physical
substance or soul); events such as hur-
ricanes (see event theory); instants and
seconds (times); points and expanses of
space (places, see space and time); the 
particular wisdom of Socrates (a trope); 
the [arbitrary] sum of Earth and Mars; the
Earth’s surface (a boundary); and shadows
and holes (privations). It is desirable that 
a philosophical analysis of the concrete/
abstract distinction be ontologically neutral,
that is, allow for the possibility of entities 
of any intelligible sort, given some plausible
view about the nature, existence conditions
and interrelationships of entities of those
sorts. This desideratum seems to require
allowing for the possibility of entities of the
aforementioned kinds. Ten attempts have
been made to analyze the concrete/abstract
distinction.
(1) Unlike abstracta, concreta are in space.
Observe that for the purposes of (1), “in space”
means occupying a place, which is different
than standing in spatial relationships. A place
stands in spatial relationships, but a place
does not occupy a place. If a place occupied
a place, then an absurd infinite regress of
places would be generated. It might be
thought that, trivially, a place occupies itself,
but this seems to confuse the relation of
Identity with the relation of Occupation.
(Note that, arguably, a parallel line of rea-
soning applies to times, where being in time
is occurring at a time (or times) or existing 
at a time (or times)). We can now see that 
(1) is inadequate because places are con-
crete, but are not themselves in space; (1) is
also inadequate because although a Cartesian
soul or spirit would be a concrete entity,
such a being would not be in space.
(2) Unlike abstracta, concreta are in space or
in time.
If absolute time is a necessary being, then (2)
avoids the problems pertaining to Cartesian
souls and places. For on that condition, 
necessarily, a Cartesian soul or a place is in
time. On the other hand, it might be assumed
that, possibly, time is relational. But, on that
assumption, (2) does seem to have difficulties
with Cartesian souls. Specifically, it appears
that if it is possible that time is relational, then
there could be a static world containing 
a Cartesian soul engaged in an atemporal
contemplation of necessary truths. Although
such an atemporal, non-spatial, thinking
substance would be a concrete entity, it
would not stand in any spatial or temporal
relationship. Moreover, (2) implies that an
abstract entity does not exist in time. As 
we shall see below, this claim is highly
problematic; all other things being equal,
an analysis of the concrete/abstract distinc-
tion that does not rely upon this assertion 
is better than one which does.
(3) Unlike abstracta, concreta are in space–
time.
There are three objections to this analysis.
First, like (1), (3) falsely implies that Cartesian
souls are abstract. Second, just as places 
are not in space, so they are not in, that is,
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